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ARGUMENT
L

BARNEY IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST BECAUSE
THE DAMAGES WERE DETERMINED WITH CERTAINTY AND
THE LOSS WAS FIXED AS OF FEBRUARY 1996.
In Uinta Pipe Line Corporation v. White Superior Company, 546 P.2d 885

(1976) the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, when it determined that Respondent
and cross appellant was not entitled to pre-judgment interest. The Court stated:

"The respondent cross-appeals because of the refusal of the trial court to
allow interest on the amount awarded prior to the date of judgment The
trial court specifically instructed the jury not to include anything by way
of interest in the verdict
The law is set forth generally in the preface to an annotation in 96A.L.R.
at page 18 as follows:
While the rule is sometimes stated that interest cannot be recovered on
unliquidated damages, the tendency of the more modern cases is to allow
interest whenever justice and equity require allowance, and, although
there is a conflict in the decisions, the rule may be stated generally that
for injury to, or detention, loss, or destruction of, property, interest may
be recovered either eo nomine on the damages found, or as apart of the
damages. " 546 P. 2d 885 at 887
The Court in Uinta, supra went on to quote from the case Fell v. Union
Pacific Rv. 31 UT 101, 88 P. 1003 ( 1907). Quoting from Fell, the Court stated:
". . . The rule has become general, and that the allowance of interest is
cases of torts to property is in harmony with the trend of modern authority.
It is quite true that there are cases against this rule, but they are not, as we
conceive, based on either good reason or good logic . . . In the class of cases,
therefore, where the damage is complete, and the amount of the loss is fixed
as of a particular time, there is-there can be -no reason why interest should
be withheld merely because the damages are unliquidated. There are certain
cases of unliquidated damages where interest cannot be allowed. In all
personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, false
2

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of
the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible. But this
is so because the damages are continuing and may even reach beyond the
time of the trial " 546 P. 2d 885 at 887
In Biork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P. 2d 315 (Utah 1977) the Supreme
Court also stated:
" As to the allowance of interest before judgement, this court has
heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is clear, viz, where the damage is
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as to the particular time and that
loss can be measured by facts andfigures, interest should be allowed from
that time and not from the date of judgement. On the other hand where
damages are incomplete or can not be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation
of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at trial and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. " 560 P.2d 315, at 316.
The damages sustained by Barney are precisely the type which should
include pre-judgment interest.
One of the elements of Barney's damage dealt with an interest in real
property. The value was determined based on the purchase price of the property which
Siddoway received directly. That information was obtained from the closing documents
which were provided by Siddoway in discovery and introduced into evidence. The
amount could be determined specifically from the facts and figures contained in the
closing documents. On cross examination, Siddoway admitted that the closing
documents were accurate and the amounts were received by him and not put into the
corporation or shared with Barney.
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Another element of damage dealt with the equipment. Both Barney and
Siddoway had received some of the equipment as of February 1996 and the value
thereof was determined by the testimony of both Barney and Siddoway. In as much as
Siddoway had taken more of the equipment, Barney was entitled to a judgment for the
value of the excess equipment Siddoway took.
Payments made on the Lincoln Continental automobile driven by Mrs.
Siddoway in violation of the agreement could also be determined from the books and
records of the company. Each monthly payment was determined accurately and
specifically. Therefor as of the dissolution, i.e. the end of February 1996, Barney was
entitled to his share of the value derived by Siddoway allowing his wife to use the
automobile.
The final element of damage was based on the amount Siddoway owed the
corporation as of February 1996. Since the amount was a loan and or additional
compensation, Barney was entitled to 50% of that amount or $6,707.82. He should
have received that when Siddoway fired him and the dissolution process began. The
amount of damages were determined to be complete as of February 1996, and could be
measured by facts and figures contained in the corporate records. Barney is entitled to
pre-judgment interest on these damages as a matter of law.
II

BARNEY IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR THE
SALARY WHICH WAS TAKEN BY SIDDOWAY IN EXCESS OF,
AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT.
Siddoway argues that Barney is raising the issue of excess salary for the first
4

time on appeal. The only thing Barney has done is to request a share equal to the
amount Siddoway took and consistent with evidence and Rule 54 of the URCP. The
excess wages was an element of damage Barney claimed from the outset of this case.
In preparation of the exhibit 17, Barney initially requested 25% of the excess
salary taken by Siddoway when in fact pursuant to the parties agreement as found by
the court, he should have received dollar for dollar the same amount of salary that
Siddoway received . The 25% figure on exhibit 17 was not correct.
Exhibit 17 prepared by Barney shows the amount of Siddoway's salary
excluding bonuses and the amount of Barney's salary excluding bonuses. Siddoway
felt and testified he was entitled to take more, several hundred dollars a month more
than Barney. The court found that this was not the parties agreement, based on the
testimony of Lee Barney and his recollection of the agreement. The information on
exhibit 17 was taken from tax returns, W-2fs , and the books and records of STL
On cross examination, the CPA, Tubber Okuda agreed with the figures based
on his own records. Okuda had records for each year except 1998 showing salary and
bonuses for both Barney and Siddoway. The information and evidence contained on
exhibit 17 therefor is accurate and unrebutted by Siddoway.
Siddoway supports his argument referring to the record where Siddoway is
testifying. The court chose not to believe Siddoway as to the nature and terms of the
agreement and instead chose to believe Barney on his version of the agreement.
Finding number 6 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law specifically states
5

that the parties were to receive an equal salary after April 1, 1989.
The damages for the excess salary were cleas -u disputed and. easily
determined Willi certainty, Maine) is entitled lo ...^ uuduiohui damages and the trial
court abused if s disnvti'M
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entitled.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
J"ie fiidgiiitiil inieu'sl is a qiK'simn oi law and ihis case fits within the
parameters

set

fQj^jj i n the Utah case law for awarding .11 piV"|ud|.»iiK'iil iiiiti/n/sil'
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is entitled to that pre-judgment interest in the amount of $13,423.89 from March 1,
• -M*

»t amount should he made part of the original judgment, and

B a m e y also requests that he be awarded the additional damages for the
excess wages taken by Siddoway in violation of the agreement of the parties. Barney is
t nulled Hi 1 .111 AW .11 ii ml Mi,II " ^ HI) lllie amount equal to the excess salary plus interest
taken by Siddoway, Barney ihould a k

.
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February 25, 1 W until June \ I 999. Barney should also be awarded his costs on
appeal.
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